

U.S. SPYING: HOW GOOD?

It's a different picture that you get of CIA—and Soviet "super-spies"—when some of the secrecy is stripped away.

Allen Dulles, longtime chief of American intelligence, has just published an insider's account of what really goes on.

A firsthand account of the spy business in the U. S. has just been put on the public record by Allen Dulles, former head of U. S. intelligence.

In the account are found answers to questions surrounded for years by controversy and, in Mr. Dulles's view, often by misrepresentation.

Did U. S. intelligence miss the boat at the Bay of Pigs? Was Khrushchev faking when he blew up over the U-2 affair? Are Russians superior, Americans inferior, when it comes to spying?

Mr. Dulles provides the answers in a new book, "The Craft of Intelligence," published by Harper & Row on October 9. Mr. Dulles says his purpose is to tell "what properly can be told"—by his own definition—about the role of the Central Intelligence Agency, which he headed for eight years until his retirement late in 1961.

The Dulles size-up:

Khrushchev and U-2. The Soviet dictator knew for years about U-2 spy flights over Russia, Mr. Dulles says, but was powerless to shoot the planes down and "did not wish to advertise the fact of his impotence to his own people." The U-2 gathered information about Russian missiles, warplanes, nuclear weapons and submarine production.

Why the sudden outburst in 1960? Mr. Dulles says it was "feigned" for psychological reasons. Khrushchev used the downing of the U-2 to torpedo the Paris summit meeting because he was not ready to talk seriously about Berlin—the chief topic. Furthermore, he was then "in deep trouble" with the Chinese Reds for seeking better relations with the West, says Mr. Dulles. Finally, Khrushchev wanted to stop President Eisenhower's scheduled visit to Russia lest the So-

viet people "react too favorably" to the U. S. President, Mr. Dulles concludes.

Bay of Pigs. "Much of the American press assumed at the time that this action was predicated on a mistaken intelligence estimate to the effect that a landing would touch off a widespread and successful popular revolt in Cuba. . . . I know of no estimate that a spontaneous uprising of the unarmed population of Cuba would be touched off by the landing."

Red missiles in Cuba. Mr. Dulles acknowledges reports from agents and refugees "indicating mysterious construction of some sort of missile bases in Cuba" prior to October, 1962, but says they came from "persons who had little technical knowledge" and therefore "did not permit a firm conclusion to be drawn."

Over all, Mr. Dulles finds that U. S. intelligence generally "misestimated that Khrushchev would not attempt to place offensive weapons in Cuba, right under our nose." A good policy, he says, is to beware of the unexpected and shocking from Khrushchev, who can advance and retreat at will.

Red intelligence: how good? Russian intelligence is overrated, says Mr. Dulles. Time and again, the Russians "pick the wrong people as agents. They misjudge character. They underestimate the power of courage and honesty."

His summing up: "Soviet intelligence is overconfident, overcomplicated and

overestimated. The real danger lies not in the mythical capabilities of the Soviet spy but in the magnitude of the Soviet intelligence effort, the money it spends, the number of people it employs, the lengths to which it is willing to go to achieve its ends and the losses it is willing and able to sustain."

U. S. intelligence: how good? U. S. intelligence is underrated, in Mr. Dulles's view. He claims that in one generation, starting from scratch, it has caught up with the rest of the world. "It is not important that American intelligence is young in years. What is important is that it is modern, and not hidebound or tied to any outdated theories."

Giving away secrets. Mr. Dulles feels the U. S. is giving away defense secrets wholesale, through complete publication of congressional hearings, through the press and through contrived and careless leaks from Government officials. He questions why the nation gives away detailed information about missile sites, exact numbers of bombers, the details of weapons. "What good does it do," he asks, "to spend millions to defend ourselves against espionage if our secrets just leak away?" He proposes that the executive branch plug the leaks.

U. S. spy failures. Mr. Dulles pinpoints two CIA "failures." One was the absence of a clear prediction that the Berlin Wall was about to be built in 1961. The other was failure to assess correctly a report of an impending coup in Iraq in 1958.

U. S. spy successes. One of his "major intelligence coups," Mr. Dulles believes, was getting a copy of Khrushchev's secret speech denouncing Stalin in 1956. The copy was obtained "many miles from Moscow" and was exploited by the U. S. for propaganda.

Other successes: CIA correctly foretold the British-French-Israeli attack on Egypt in 1956. It predicted the launching of the first Soviet satellite in 1957.

By strong implication, Mr. Dulles is proudest of all of the performance turned in by CIA's U-2 spy planes. He says: "In a sense, [their] feats could be equaled only by the acquisition of technical documents directly from Soviet offices and laborato-

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The record of refugees from Communist areas, from the end of World War II to erection of the Berlin Wall in 1961, as reported by Allen Dulles:

East Germany	3,600,000
Baltic States	200,000
European satellites	1,783,000
Communist China	3,000,000
Asian satellites	2,000,000
Soviet Russia	1,000,000
TOTAL	11,583,000

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